

STATEMENT BY

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BEFORE THE

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS  
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COUNTERING THE GLOBAL CHALLENGE OF IEDs TODAY  
AND IN THE FUTURE

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Chairman Snyder, Congressman Wittman, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to report on the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO). Following a short update on the improvised explosive device (IED) threat and JIEDDO's response to that threat over the past year, my testimony will discuss our ongoing efforts and vision for the future.

### **Afghanistan and Iraq**

In the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility the single most effective weapon employed by our enemies and the predominant killer in both Afghanistan and Iraq continues to be the IED.

To counter the potential strategic impact of this threat, the Department of Defense (DoD) established JIEDDO with a great sense of urgency in 2006. Congress quickly followed suit by enacting special funding for JIEDDO operations in 2007. With these special operating authorities and our direct reporting chain to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, JIEDDO rapidly matured to accomplish its mission to focus DoD actions in support of all 10 United States' Combatant Commands (COCOM) in their efforts to defeat IEDs as a weapon of strategic influence. With four specified mission areas—strategic planning; rapid acquisition; near real-time information fusion delivered to warfighters as knowledge; and operations and training support to the force—JIEDDO continues to make great strides in our evolution as an effective, high impact organization operating in support of warfighters. Though our challenges have been great, results during our short history have been dramatic, especially in CENTCOM.

Since our last meeting in September of 2008, there have been over 10,000 IED incidents in Iraq. These incidents are diverse, consisting of the following: explosively formed projectiles commonly known as EFPs, underbelly devices, homemade explosives, suicide IEDs, victim-operated IEDs using pressure switches, and radio controlled anti-armor IEDs, among others. These devices employ a wide range of arming and firing

switches, from relatively simple command wire to sophisticated radio-controlled and passive infrared switches. Yet, in spite of this high volume and wide range of IED attacks over the past 12 months, the number of attacks that were effective against our forces continued to decline for the second straight year.

While I am pleased with our progress in Iraq, our work is not yet done. Our organization is poised to support our continuing diplomatic mission and United States' forces as the drawdown proceeds in accordance with the Security Agreement. In addition, while we have learned an enormous amount from our experience in Iraq, not all of these lessons translate to our efforts in Afghanistan.

The environment and the enemy in Afghanistan pose an altogether different challenge. Although initially slower to develop in Afghanistan, the IED has now replaced direct fire weapons as the enemy's weapon of choice. Our enemies in Afghanistan also use IEDs in combination with conventional direct and indirect fire weapons as a part of complex attacks.

Furthermore, Afghanistan local insurgents, tribal factions, and the Taliban enjoy a greater freedom of action to emplace large numbers of IEDs in movement corridors vital to our success. Our challenge is further compounded because these groups intimidate local populations, preventing their cooperation with the often suspiciously viewed Afghan government and, in turn, with us.

To ensure the most comprehensive possible support to this complex theater, JIEDDO has undertaken an ongoing Afghanistan support planning process that has so far generated more than 100 counter-IED initiatives for this theater. Continually refined as we move forward, this planning effort provides an ongoing assessment which guides department-level decision makers on critical counter-IED investments and resource allocations.

## **Confronting a Global Threat**

Outside of CENTCOM, nearly 300 IED incidents every month around the globe confirm that the dangers from this weapon also reach far beyond the borders of Afghanistan and Iraq. Since September 2008 there have been over 3,500 total IED incidents and the number is growing. Enabled by the ability to rapidly exploit readily available commercial technology, violent extremists can easily share the results of their efforts across real-time global communications networks.

This toxic mix allows potential enemies to forge international relationships and to migrate IED technology and techniques accordingly. As a result, we see a growing and dangerous global IED threat beyond CENTCOM, especially in Africa Command, Pacific Command, and Southern Command. You may be familiar with some recent incidents.

On 17 July 2009, Islamic extremists linked to a faction of the Indonesian terrorist group Jemaah Islamiya conducted two successful person-borne IED suicide attacks against two Western hotels in Jakarta, killing nine and wounding dozens more. The incident illustrates the ability of al-Qaeda to successfully inspire IED attacks by like-minded groups around the globe.

On 17 September 2009 in Somalia, al-Qaeda linked al-Shabaab insurgents detonated two suicide vehicle-borne IEDs inside the African Union Mission in Somalia headquarters compound in Mogadishu. The attack claimed the lives of 14 African Union Soldiers, including the former Deputy Commander of that mission.

As recently as 29 September 2009, two American military personnel attached to Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines were killed by an IED on Jolo Island as they traveled in an armored high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle with Philippine military personnel to support a humanitarian project. The attack is attributed to local Islamist militants. Though likely not specifically targeting United States personnel, this

incident highlights the global IED threat faced by American forces when operating with foreign partners. These were the first United States military fatalities in the Philippines since 2002.

There have been two recent high-profile arrests highlighting the fact that the IED threat is not just a distant problem, but one that sits on our doorstep:

On 21 September 2009, the FBI arrested a 24-year old Afghan immigrant, Najibullah Zazi, for plotting to emplace IEDs at New York Fashion Week venues and at sports stadiums. Zazi received training in the construction of IEDs from al-Qaeda operatives in Pakistan and had enlisted the assistance of several others, including his father, a shuttle bus driver at a New York airport, in the plot.

On 25 September 2009, the FBI arrested 19-year old Hosam Maher Husein Smadai, a Jordanian national, for attempting to destroy a 60-story glass office building in downtown Dallas, Texas. During an undercover operation, the FBI provided Smadai with an inert IED, which he then placed in a vehicle that he parked near the structure. His intent was to bring the fight back to United States soil and further the Islamic extremist agenda.

Our allies in the war against extremism continue to face the IED threat on a daily basis. Pakistan has been rocked on a nearly continuously by a Pakistani Taliban IED campaign waged against governmental and security infrastructures. This campaign of terror has led the Government of Pakistan to commit nearly 30,000 troops to regain control of the Taliban safe havens in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and the Northwest Frontier Province.

## **Ongoing JIEDDO Efforts: JIEDDO's Lines of Operations (LOO)**

JIEDDO organizes all of its efforts across three LOOs—defeating IEDs in whatever form they take; enabling attacks on IED networks wherever they arise; and training our warfighters to survive and succeed against both.

**Defeat the Device.** During our first two years of operations we were in a race against time to defeat the effects of IEDs on the battlefield. As casualties mounted we quickly learned that we must innovate faster than a ruthless, agile enemy capable of rapidly adapting commercial off-the-shelf technologies and IED tactics an estimated three times inside of one of our budget cycles. With Congressionally-directed funding we were able to counter these rapid innovation cycles by creating a unique, transparent, and analytically driven rapid acquisition process that allows us to deliver risk-tolerant solutions to warfighters in months versus the years associated with the conventional acquisition system that manages force modernization programs.

This process, called the Joint IED Defeat Capability Approval and Acquisition Management Process (JCAAMP), accommodates a high degree of uncertainty. Operating within a 0-24 month window, as opposed to the much longer DoD budget process that cannot respond to the current urgency of warfighter needs, JIEDDO has quickly evolved as DoD's premiere agency for rapid invention, and rapid development and delivery of those inventions into the hands of warfighters. Highlights of our current efforts include: the suite of technical forensics programs known as weapons technical intelligence, counter radio-controller electronic warfare commonly referred to as CREW, various signatures programs, and more than 90 other enduring counter-IED capabilities, that resulted from 240 materiel solutions delivered to warfighters during the past three years.

JCAAMP also manages the counter-IED technology development portfolio. In conjunction with the Services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, JIEDDO is responsible for integrating all of DoD's counter-IED technology efforts. Efforts that

show promise include potential new sensors, data exploitation, sensor and information fusion to detect IEDs, blasting cap neutralization, and formal collaboration with the medical community to prevent and mitigate traumatic injuries.

JCAAMP is not perfect, but it is valuable because it allows us to bypass existing cumbersome, risk-adverse processes in order to respond to warfighters in time to have an impact. As we continue to refine JCAAMP and the Services more fully participate in their roles within the process, the natural friction that currently exists between us will continue to diminish. What is most important is that JIEDDO continues to demonstrate every day that DoD can respond to urgent warfighter needs in a collaborative process with transparency and comprehensive oversight.

**Attack the Network.** Despite our technology successes we know that defeating devices is not enough and that we need to better enable offensive operations by developing capabilities to support attacks against IED networks. We must exploit the use of information as one of our greatest asymmetric advantages. To that end, JIEDDO created the Counter-IED Operations Integration Center (COIC) in 2006. The COIC gives warfighters unprecedented capability to attack enemy networks by delivering near real-time fused information, especially for forces at brigade, or regimental, through corps level.

Key Attack the Network efforts include support to sniper teams by enabling observation and targeting in all weather, day or night, to defeat IED emplacements along routes with significant IED activity. JIEDDO has also funded a nonmateriel counter-IED capability that actively geo-locates and targets communications devices, allowing our forces to find, fix, and finish IED-related command and control nodes. Finally, JIEDDO continues to lead efforts in developing change detection capabilities with proofs-of-concepts currently underway in CENTCOM.

**Train the Force.** None of these efforts will generate the desired impact without providing the best possible counter-IED training support to our warfighters. JIEDDO constantly strives to raise the bar by rapidly adapting and infusing our cutting edge programs, such as signatures and social dynamics, into counter-IED training programs across DoD.

Additionally, JIEDDO Headquarters, in conjunction with our Joint Center of Excellence at Ft. Irwin California, rapidly incorporates feedback from JIEDDO-deployed field teams, unit debrief teams, and in-theater surveys into Service training programs. By funding substantial modifications to combat training centers and home station training programs, JIEDDO has enabled world-class counter-IED training for warfighters and units at the tactical level.

Our contributions to predeployment battle staff training for brigade and regimental combat teams, as well as division and corps headquarters is equally impressive. This leader training has been significantly enhanced with the development of the Joint Training Counter-IED Operations Integration Center (JTCOIC) located in Norfolk, Virginia. Within the past year, the JTCOIC has built both physical and virtual partnerships of government, industry, and academic experts who focus on predeployment training that replicates the most complex and difficult circumstances that our leaders and their units will face on battlefield. In 2008 and early 2009, JTCOIC constructed its physical facility, expanded its architecture, acquired access to critical databases, and developed relationships with the training communities across all of the Services.

JIEDDO is currently working closely with the Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, to publish capstone counter-IED doctrine for Joint Forces. Once published, this doctrine will bridge the gap in what our forces have learned at the tactical level over the past seven years. Our goal is to provide both the tactical and operational level commanders with the requisite knowledge to train, organize, and resource their forces for the counter-IED fight.



The key to our success has been, and always will be, world-class training. Unfortunately, no one could have anticipated the sheer amount and complexity of the training required to successfully counter IEDs. JEDDO's mission is to grab those emerging, hard training problems and find ways for the Services and our partners to overcome them.

To guarantee our continued success in this area, we are in the process of developing a comprehensive DOD-wide counter-IED training architecture that will give us an evolutionary jump forward by federating all ongoing counter-IED training across the Services the interagency, and our partner nations. By sharing our resources, insights, and best of breed practices we plan to achieve a level of training synergy never seen before.

### **Collaboration and Partnerships**

In recent testimony to Congress, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen, indicated that, absent a broader international and interagency approach to the problems there, no amount of troops in no amount of time can ever achieve the objectives we seek in Afghanistan. This is certainly true in the fight against IEDs.

JIEDDO was designed to function as a catalyst working across DoD, interagency, international, and commercial domains in order to identify and leverage the best resources we can bring to bear against IEDs. As a result, JIEDDO has developed a vast array of collaborative relationships. Our unimpeded access to the COCOMs, Services, the interagency, and allies, coupled with our National Capitol Region presence, has allowed us to leverage large networks comprised of industry, academia, laboratories, federally funded research and development corporations, and government agencies to pursue solutions to the IED challenge.

## **Stewardship of Resources**

JIEDDO operates with special authorities as outlined in DoD Directive 2000.19E. These authorities and special Congressional funding enable us to operate efficiently and effectively in ways that other DoD entities cannot. We have been fortunate to operate with the confidence of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Congress, both of whom have given us tremendous support and guidance as we have grown in capability and in our role of bringing together the entire enterprise to rapidly develop counter-IED capabilities.

JCAAMP is our capstone process to make this happen. Sensitive to our mandate to be good stewards, JCAAMP is designed to bring the Department's most senior stakeholders, including the Services, together in a validation and funding decision process. The formal collaboration directed by JCAAMP helps us avoid unnecessary duplicative efforts and provides early visibility to the Services on initiatives that will transition or transfer to them in the future. We're able to accomplish these objectives while ensuring we can respond rapidly to support the COCOMs. JIEDDO continues to improve and refine our JCAAMP processes and will publish a revised version of the JCAAMP governing instruction in November 2009.

JIEDDO is making steady progress in establishing internal control processes to provide assurance that managers execute effective stewardship of resources. Based on our own internal review and with the help of the Government Accountability Office we determined the need to increase our government workforce to provide better control procedures. Over the past year, JIEDDO has been actively recruiting and hiring top-notch government civil servants to address this need.

## **Living in an Era of Persistent Conflict**

Since our last meeting a little over a year ago, I have become more convinced than ever that we live in an era of persistent conflict. To echo Secretary Gates, the clear lines that distinguished conventional and irregular warfare have blurred. We now confront a complex, hybrid form of conflict ranging from near-peer competitors who will use irregular or asymmetric tactics, to non-state or rogue state actors capable of generating violence across a broad spectrum of weapons ranging from IEDs to weapons of mass destruction.

Whether we choose to call it a Global War on Terror, a Long War, or an era of persistent conflict makes no difference. We have been at it for eight years and I believe this enemy will continue to fight us for the foreseeable future; certainly for the rest of my lifetime, and probably beyond. Violent extremists will continue to wage conflict against human targets and the weapon of choice will continue to be the IED-- we can never be satisfied with the results we achieve.

We must further diminish the strategic effects of IEDs, reducing their appeal for increased global employment. We must strive for an ever greater impact through the continued aggressive development of new, innovative ways to make this weapon too costly to produce and too risky to employ. While we will never completely chase this weapon off the battlefield, we must continue to eliminate its ability to affect us strategically.

## **JIEDDO's Vision for the Future**

The enemy we face for the foreseeable future knows how to exploit our vulnerabilities. Possessing a very long view, time is unimportant to this enemy—they don't need it, and they hope we will waste it. They believe our resolve will weaken with the passage of years. Now, more than ever, we must understand that and stay the course.

Looking forward, IEDDO is on the cusp of some potentially game changing developments in the areas of command wire, signatures, weapons technical intelligence, and biometrics. Unfortunately, we have already harvested most of the mature technologies available to us. As we move forward, our technology development may require longer term commitments of both time and money.

We also have several long-term collaborative efforts underway that will greatly inform our evolving approach to IED networks and how to defeat them. In addition to a robust interagency working group focused on the social dynamics of human networks, we have also initiated a series of red team and competitive strategies gaming efforts that will hopefully allow us to leap frog the enemy and break the endless cycles of IED measures, counter measures, and counter-countermeasures that have characterized this conflict.

We have not yet completed the necessary, difficult work of developing a common counter-IED military doctrine or defining the requirements for the establishment of comprehensive, coherent expeditionary counter-IED units. We also have a long way to go in building the standards and scope for counter-IED training, both for specialized units and across the joint force.

We have barely paved a path of formal partnerships with our allies. These relationships are vitally important to our success but remain fragile in execution. We have made some inroads but still need to remove the many obstacles that hobble our ability to conduct information sharing critical to our success. We need to strengthen our commitment and forge the bonds necessary to beat this enemy.

A long term commitment on the part of our nation's most senior leaders is required to win this fight. JIEDDO sits at the center of that commitment. A permanent JIEDDO – funded in the base budget – is the clear signal that we understand what we are up against for the foreseeable future and that we are willing to invest the money, the time, the energy, and the talent to make sure we win. I recognize this will not be easy, but I believe it is necessary.

I have proudly worn the uniform of the United States Army for over 43 years. As I near retirement, I could not have asked to be in a better assignment, and I could not be more proud of the men and women who are helping me defeat the IED as a weapon of strategic influence. They are passionate about our mission, and they display daily a sense of urgency as they work to defeat the device, to attack the networks and to train the force to do both. We can count the numbers of those killed in action and wounded in action, but we will never know the number of lives, limbs, and eyesight that have been saved by our actions. However, I know they have been and will continue to be saved by the efforts of the wonderful men and women who work for the Joint IED Defeat Organization. Countering the IED is at the heart of the war we now find ourselves fighting. My experience tells me to be optimistic because of Soldiers, Marines, Sailors, Airmen and civilians who sacrifice daily to accomplish the missions we give them.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you and your Subcommittee for inviting me here today to discuss an issue that I feel most passionate about.